I have tried to explain this to so many people and they just do not want to know. I guess the very idea that the gov itself has been compromised by the banking cabal and their own gov is robbing them, to pay for call the “free” stuff is just too much to comprehend
Thanks, Henry. Well, 1933 happened under a gold standard, where the government needed the metal to back the dollar. It doesn’t need your gold now. What it needs is your savings in Treasuries. Granted, that’s a different kind of confiscation (and the one the essay is about).
Good article that points out a hidden mechanism driving inflation. I have some questions and observations.
How are stablecoins going to act as a new sponge? The purchasers are free to redeem them so they are not captive buyers. If US$ is subject to severe inflation, it seems like buyers will stop buying and holders will get out of them? The current size of the market is a tiny fraction of the current debt and it doesn't seem likely that it can grow enough to handle deficits of $1T to $2T.
Since the maximum maturity for backing stablecoins is 93 days or less. Technically, that allows the Fed to keep the short term rates artificially low, but short-term treasuries mature quickly and if no one wants to buy the treasuries at the Fed rate, the Fed has to buy any unsold Treasuries. That could quickly lead to rapid monetary expansion and fast inflationary loops rather than a hidden devaluation.
The FIMA "pawn shop" acts to prevent dumping of existing Treasuries but it does not generate new structural buying which is going to be needed if we continue running $1T+ deficits.
We're going to have to deal with it sooner rather than later. I don't see the world continuing to purchase increasing amounts of a currency that is continuing to inflate to nothing.
When the crisis does arrive, I believe the government will require them in every 401(k). Every pension, every insurance program, whatever these pigs can regulate to keep this crap show going they will do it. Financial repression. Buckle up.
That’s the next step, and it has precedent. Pensions and insurers were loaded up with Treasuries by regulation in the 1940s too. Nobody called it repression then either.
Good questions. On stablecoins, you’re right that the holder can redeem. But the issuer can’t, in the sense that by law the reserve has to sit in bills. So the captive party isn’t the user, it’s the US$300 billion pool. And of course the aim is to grow that pool. Whether it can scale to the deficits is a fair doubt. On the Fed as the backstop for unsold bills, yes, that’s the explicit end of the chain, and it’s why, as the piece says, this works as long as the lenders can’t leave. FIMA isn’t meant to create new buying. It’s meant to stop the old buyers from selling. Thanks for reading and taking the time to comment, Jim.
I don't understand why the issuer can't redeem the reserves if the holder returns the stablecoins to the issuer. Assume the following: 1) Investor purchases $100M in stablecoins from an issuer which requires $100M in short-term treasures to back the newly minted stablecoins purchased. 2) The investor later wants the $100M in cash so redeems the stablecoins with the issuer. 3) in order to redeem the stablecoins, the issuer sells the short-term treasuries (ignoring any price change or transaction fees) for cash. 4) Cash is sent to the investor and stablecoins are returned to the issuer.
Can't the issuer just destroy the stablecoins in order to remove the reserve requirement?
It's my understanding that the reserve requirement is only for stablecoins in active circulation. Unless there is some regulatory requirement for an asset to be held in stablecoins, it seems that holders of stablecoins could just get redeem their coins. Once all stablecoins are redeemed, there is no reserve requirement.
If stablecoins are to be the sponge, the assumption is that the supply continues to grow but in reality, that supply could vanish if people don't want to hold them.
Is there something I'm missing?
I agree that FIMA is only to prevent selling and not create new buyers.
The problem is that we're adding $1T or more to debt every year or faster. There's a limit to how much debt the world market can/will take. I think we're starting to see resistance to taking more. At some point that resistance starts to increase dramatically resulting in huge increases in interest rates or huge buying by the fed causing dollar devaluing. Once inflation spikes high enough people find another place to put wealth.
I was with a company selling products in Argentina in 1989 and 1990. Inflation was over 3,000% in 1989. We couldn't get the money converted fast enough to overcome inflation losses so we resorted to barter - selling products for hard goods that could be sold without the inflation losses.
We're not yet at those levels but it seems we're trying hard to get there.
My son who is an administrator/professor in Indiana [we're in KS where he grew up) is back for a quick visit and just walked by my home office where I've been excitedly studying this essay and sat down to listen as I shared how amazed I am by the lucid manner in which Lau explained what Bessant is doing. None of this was really new to my thoughts and understandings, but I'd never seen these details explained in this manner. But so much of these details and many of the concepts are foreign to the intellectual constructs that form my son's world view that he was interested, even excited, but also alarmed and wanting to understand more and elicit further considerations and discussions of the implications, etc. Thanks, Lau, for putting this essay together. Please continue to help out and stimulate in this manner. I hadn't looked at other comments and just glanced and am reminded of how many such revelations as Lau has shared stimulate angry comments blaming the government or the bank cabal or etc ... Sure, of course, but I realize my basic reaction is not on how this is wrong but rather on maybe, probably, this is the best way forward even though it's a terrible tax on the less privileged among us and just pushing the crisis further down the line. But, frankly, I'd rather push the crisis down the line than default on the debt or collapse into utter chaos. For now, anyway, until we figure out a kinder landing of this ultimately unsustainable way of managing our personal lives, our communities, our countries, international relationships. That's how it seems to me now. I'm looking for better solutions. Just haven't found them. Thanks for the stimulation. Jay
Thanks, Jay. That’s about the best thing a writer can hear: that the piece became a conversation at your kitchen table. You're 100% correct. Between devaluation, default and chaos, devaluation is the one a government can survive, which is why it’s always the one they pick. My only quarrel is with pretending it’s something else. Say hi to your son.
Will do. And you tell your family many of your readers appreciate your family centered community of care articulate sharing of your lives with them/us. Yes. Jay
Michael Howell called a bullet point in your inflation chart called "Treasury QE": The gov runs fiscal deficit, deficit swells private sector deposits (the guys who are building datacenters) and the banks are forced, by Fed designed liquidity requirements to buy Treasury bills. "Treasury QE".
Just 5 years of 5% inflation undercounted (say inflation is running 8% but being expressed as 3%, would bring 100 debt to gdp down to 77% of gdp. This is warsh's job.
Appreciate it, Kerz. Howell’s framing is a good one, and it’s basically the same loop I was describing: the deficit creates the deposits, and the regulations turn the deposits into bill demand. On the undercounting, I’d be careful with the specific numbers, but the direction is 100% right. Every point by which the official figure understates the real one is a point of extra spread nobody has to vote for.
Or maybe the US govt could increase taxes on the wealthy and on corporations. Plus cut the defense budget in half by focusing on defense and stopping silly wars and stopping buying expensive weapons by focusing on cheaper drones?
Reducing debt by inflation essentially makes all non-wealthy poorer by devaluing the currency,
Even if both happened, it wouldn’t close the gap. Double the corporate tax take and halve defense and you’ve found maybe US$800 billion against a US$2 trillion deficit, before interest grows again. But your last sentence is right, and that’s the point of the essay. Inflating the debt away is a tax on the people least able to dodge it. Thanks for reading.
I agree. However, everything a person does to move them selves forward, is fair game. We are not in the “club”… Our homes, our health, our families are at risk. It is up to us to take care of our immediate area. And enjoy the days with fun and healthy life…
Thanks, John. Should I list every country that won? My grandfather fought on the Eastern Front, and somehow I don’t think he’d be offended by the statement that America won the war too.
'Should I list every country' is a silly remark Lau. For the record my father fought and won medals for bravery in the second war. I am certain he would take offence. The allies won the war and America turned up late (again).
I largely agree with your thesis, but I see a potential problem with the “captive buyers” part of the argument.
Stablecoins may create substantial demand for T-bills, but to the extent that stablecoin balances come from bank deposits, aren't we partly moving money from one Treasury buyer/funding channel to another rather than creating genuinely new demand?
More importantly, financial repression has a cost. If banks, insurers, pension funds and money-market funds are increasingly pushed into Treasuries at negative real yields, the losses do not disappear. They eventually show up as weaker bank/insurance profitability, pension funding problems, lower returns for savers and retirees, or higher contributions and premiums. Politically, that could become difficult to sustain.
And the stronger the repression becomes, the greater the incentive for unconstrained investors to move toward equities, gold, foreign assets and other stores of value.
So I wonder whether the real constraint on this strategy is not the government's ability to manufacture Treasury demand, but how much negative real return it can impose on the domestic financial system before the economic and political side effects become too large.
Thanks, Attila. All fair, and I’d agree the real limit is political rather than mechanical. On stablecoins: partly a reshuffle, yes, but a deposit funds whatever the bank chooses, while a stablecoin reserve is bills by law. It converts optional demand into mandatory demand, which is the point. On the cost of repression, it doesn’t disappear, it lands on savers, pensioners and bank margins, slowly enough that nobody can point to the day it happened. That’s the design. The 1940s and 50s imposed it for fifteen years without a revolt. And on the exodus to gold and equities: agreed, and that’s exactly where I’d want to be. :)
Thanks, Lau. I agree with the mechanics of your argument, but I have some reservations about using the 1940s and 1950s as a precedent for what might work today.
First, the underlying growth conditions were fundamentally different. Postwar America benefited from much higher fertility, an expanding workforce, and, over subsequent decades, a dramatic increase in female labour-force participation. Today, with fertility around 1.6, an ageing population, and much lower potential real GDP growth, we have far less capacity to grow our way out of the debt burden.
Second, from an Austrian economics perspective, today's starting point is very different. Decades of exceptionally low interest rates have arguably encouraged malinvestment and distortions in the capital structure. Further suppressing real interest rates risks perpetuating these distortions, discouraging the necessary reallocation of capital, and weakening future productivity growth. Financial repression may reduce the government's financing costs without increasing the real savings needed to support productive investment.
Third, the structure of Treasury demand has changed substantially. Unlike in the 1940s, investors can legally move into gold and other assets to escape negative real yields. An ageing population is increasingly drawing down retirement savings rather than accumulating them, potentially reducing net demand for financial assets. And foreign investors now hold roughly 30% of publicly held Treasuries, making the market far more dependent on investors who cannot easily be compelled to accept negative real dollar returns.
Finally, the costs of repression would increasingly fall directly on households through defined-contribution pensions, 401(k)s, and other retirement savings. Persistent negative real returns could erode the purchasing power of accumulated savings precisely when a growing share of the population depends on them.
My concern is therefore not whether the government can mechanically create captive demand for Treasuries. It probably can, at least for some time. The question is whether doing so in an ageing, low-growth economy, already burdened by accumulated capital distortions, would progressively undermine the real savings, productive capital formation, and economic growth needed to sustain the debt itself.
The postwar U.S. could combine financial repression with strong underlying growth. Today, we may be attempting the same strategy under almost the opposite structural conditions.
Could financial repression therefore become economically self-defeating long before it becomes politically unsustainable?
Thanks, Attila. I think we mostly agree, so let me clarify one thing: I’m not saying this will work. The essay is about what the gov't will probably do, not whether it succeeds. And on that score you’re basically making my case for me. No growth tailwind, capital already misallocated, buyers who can leave, losses landing on households. All true, and also all reasons the “other means” have to get more coercive over time, not less. The FIMA pawn shop exists precisely because the foreign 30% can’t be compelled, not directly at least. And of course the stablecoin push exists because the domestic buyers aren’t captive enough yet. So the way I see it, each tool is an admission that the last one wasn’t sufficient. Self-defeating before politically unsustainable? Probably. At the end of the day, “repression” doesn’t fix anything. It buys time at the cost of growth. That’s the Argentine lesson.
Thanks, Lau. That clarification makes sense, and I think we largely agree. I approached the question from the perspective of whether financial repression could succeed under today's structural conditions. In contrast, you focus on why governments will increasingly resort to it regardless of the long-term consequences.
Your point that each new intervention reflects the inadequacy of the previous one is particularly interesting. It also fits the Austrian perspective: interventions intended to correct the consequences of earlier interventions tend to generate further distortions, creating pressure for yet more intervention.
And I agree that the Argentine experience may ultimately be a more relevant warning than the postwar American precedent. Financial repression can postpone the adjustment, but it cannot eliminate the underlying economic problem.
On the street I live, replaying the film in slow-motion helps to filter out the daily noise:
The road map is price stability from productivity gains...
1. An upward trending wage inflation and close to full employment for households as a consequence of "re-migration" and it's effect on labor market prices.
2. The inflation pressures from above 1. are moderated and netted out by gigantic productivity gains as knowledge intensive workers replace the re-migrated (hand-to-head-use-ratio change). E.g. enormous productivity gains take place throughout all value chains when former knowledge workers participate in new and existing businesses, streamlining and professionalizing them.
The auctioning and pairing of previously unavailable supply/demand of knowledge could be explosive if amplified by...
3. Flow and broader redistribution of risk capital from inheritance events. This is currently locked up with conservative generations who have less an idea of how to navigate "the now" and capitalize on it.
4. And finally of course all the new real or imagined headcount created (enormous productivity gains) at the data centers throughout the nation. Even if as expected only 50% enter operation it should be quite the fireworks.
5. The USD will survive via elevated rates as the new normal AND be used as our biggest weapon in dealing with friends as foes alike (rinse repeat). We did it in the 80ies and will likely resort to the same screenplay as we head toward renewed tension abroad. The main difference between then and now is that we "own" a lot of real estate and board rooms.
Trump likely meant what he said, but "forgot" to mention which type of inflation he meant: Wage inflation without the evils of broad price inflation.
Great article on how the hidden tax of inflation sticks it to those that cannot afford it and most do not realize what is happening.
They will blame the greedy corporations and anyone else but the government which caused it all to begin with.
Thanks!
>>They will blame the greedy corporations and anyone else but the government which caused it all to begin with.
That’s the beauty of it from the gov't's side.
I have tried to explain this to so many people and they just do not want to know. I guess the very idea that the gov itself has been compromised by the banking cabal and their own gov is robbing them, to pay for call the “free” stuff is just too much to comprehend
The government is the banking cabal
As Ludwig von Mises said, "Inflation is first and foremost a government problem." It's not the businessman that causes it; it is only the government.
To paraphrase the new reality, the markets can stay manipulated longer than you can remain solvent.
💯
Yes, currently we can buy and own gold. But things change and 1933 may return and holding gold becomes illegal again. Then what?
Thanks, Henry. Well, 1933 happened under a gold standard, where the government needed the metal to back the dollar. It doesn’t need your gold now. What it needs is your savings in Treasuries. Granted, that’s a different kind of confiscation (and the one the essay is about).
At $4000/oz for AU you can still keep some around your neck. Harder with AG. Gets a little heavy. :)
Good article that points out a hidden mechanism driving inflation. I have some questions and observations.
How are stablecoins going to act as a new sponge? The purchasers are free to redeem them so they are not captive buyers. If US$ is subject to severe inflation, it seems like buyers will stop buying and holders will get out of them? The current size of the market is a tiny fraction of the current debt and it doesn't seem likely that it can grow enough to handle deficits of $1T to $2T.
Since the maximum maturity for backing stablecoins is 93 days or less. Technically, that allows the Fed to keep the short term rates artificially low, but short-term treasuries mature quickly and if no one wants to buy the treasuries at the Fed rate, the Fed has to buy any unsold Treasuries. That could quickly lead to rapid monetary expansion and fast inflationary loops rather than a hidden devaluation.
The FIMA "pawn shop" acts to prevent dumping of existing Treasuries but it does not generate new structural buying which is going to be needed if we continue running $1T+ deficits.
We're going to have to deal with it sooner rather than later. I don't see the world continuing to purchase increasing amounts of a currency that is continuing to inflate to nothing.
When the crisis does arrive, I believe the government will require them in every 401(k). Every pension, every insurance program, whatever these pigs can regulate to keep this crap show going they will do it. Financial repression. Buckle up.
That’s the next step, and it has precedent. Pensions and insurers were loaded up with Treasuries by regulation in the 1940s too. Nobody called it repression then either.
Good questions. On stablecoins, you’re right that the holder can redeem. But the issuer can’t, in the sense that by law the reserve has to sit in bills. So the captive party isn’t the user, it’s the US$300 billion pool. And of course the aim is to grow that pool. Whether it can scale to the deficits is a fair doubt. On the Fed as the backstop for unsold bills, yes, that’s the explicit end of the chain, and it’s why, as the piece says, this works as long as the lenders can’t leave. FIMA isn’t meant to create new buying. It’s meant to stop the old buyers from selling. Thanks for reading and taking the time to comment, Jim.
I don't understand why the issuer can't redeem the reserves if the holder returns the stablecoins to the issuer. Assume the following: 1) Investor purchases $100M in stablecoins from an issuer which requires $100M in short-term treasures to back the newly minted stablecoins purchased. 2) The investor later wants the $100M in cash so redeems the stablecoins with the issuer. 3) in order to redeem the stablecoins, the issuer sells the short-term treasuries (ignoring any price change or transaction fees) for cash. 4) Cash is sent to the investor and stablecoins are returned to the issuer.
Can't the issuer just destroy the stablecoins in order to remove the reserve requirement?
It's my understanding that the reserve requirement is only for stablecoins in active circulation. Unless there is some regulatory requirement for an asset to be held in stablecoins, it seems that holders of stablecoins could just get redeem their coins. Once all stablecoins are redeemed, there is no reserve requirement.
If stablecoins are to be the sponge, the assumption is that the supply continues to grow but in reality, that supply could vanish if people don't want to hold them.
Is there something I'm missing?
I agree that FIMA is only to prevent selling and not create new buyers.
The problem is that we're adding $1T or more to debt every year or faster. There's a limit to how much debt the world market can/will take. I think we're starting to see resistance to taking more. At some point that resistance starts to increase dramatically resulting in huge increases in interest rates or huge buying by the fed causing dollar devaluing. Once inflation spikes high enough people find another place to put wealth.
I was with a company selling products in Argentina in 1989 and 1990. Inflation was over 3,000% in 1989. We couldn't get the money converted fast enough to overcome inflation losses so we resorted to barter - selling products for hard goods that could be sold without the inflation losses.
We're not yet at those levels but it seems we're trying hard to get there.
I noticed that comment by Trump, also.
Was it a slip? Or did he reveal his true intent? I think he meant exactly what he said.
Same read here. He’s said it more than once now, and in a few different ways.
Wage price inflation only, not general price inflation.
Thanks so much! Real education like this is VERY difficult to come by.
Thanks, Glen. Appreciate that.
My son who is an administrator/professor in Indiana [we're in KS where he grew up) is back for a quick visit and just walked by my home office where I've been excitedly studying this essay and sat down to listen as I shared how amazed I am by the lucid manner in which Lau explained what Bessant is doing. None of this was really new to my thoughts and understandings, but I'd never seen these details explained in this manner. But so much of these details and many of the concepts are foreign to the intellectual constructs that form my son's world view that he was interested, even excited, but also alarmed and wanting to understand more and elicit further considerations and discussions of the implications, etc. Thanks, Lau, for putting this essay together. Please continue to help out and stimulate in this manner. I hadn't looked at other comments and just glanced and am reminded of how many such revelations as Lau has shared stimulate angry comments blaming the government or the bank cabal or etc ... Sure, of course, but I realize my basic reaction is not on how this is wrong but rather on maybe, probably, this is the best way forward even though it's a terrible tax on the less privileged among us and just pushing the crisis further down the line. But, frankly, I'd rather push the crisis down the line than default on the debt or collapse into utter chaos. For now, anyway, until we figure out a kinder landing of this ultimately unsustainable way of managing our personal lives, our communities, our countries, international relationships. That's how it seems to me now. I'm looking for better solutions. Just haven't found them. Thanks for the stimulation. Jay
Thanks, Jay. That’s about the best thing a writer can hear: that the piece became a conversation at your kitchen table. You're 100% correct. Between devaluation, default and chaos, devaluation is the one a government can survive, which is why it’s always the one they pick. My only quarrel is with pretending it’s something else. Say hi to your son.
Will do. And you tell your family many of your readers appreciate your family centered community of care articulate sharing of your lives with them/us. Yes. Jay
And why would anyone voluntarily buy long term bonds if they intend to inflate the debt away? You are simply holding a melting ice cube in your hands!
They don’t, voluntarily. That’s the whole reason for the captive buyers.
More likely they will force you to keep a portion of your retirement funds in long term treasuries.
Quite possibly. Argentina did it outright in 2008. The American version would probably come with better branding though :)
Fantastic post.
Michael Howell called a bullet point in your inflation chart called "Treasury QE": The gov runs fiscal deficit, deficit swells private sector deposits (the guys who are building datacenters) and the banks are forced, by Fed designed liquidity requirements to buy Treasury bills. "Treasury QE".
Just 5 years of 5% inflation undercounted (say inflation is running 8% but being expressed as 3%, would bring 100 debt to gdp down to 77% of gdp. This is warsh's job.
Appreciate it, Kerz. Howell’s framing is a good one, and it’s basically the same loop I was describing: the deficit creates the deposits, and the regulations turn the deposits into bill demand. On the undercounting, I’d be careful with the specific numbers, but the direction is 100% right. Every point by which the official figure understates the real one is a point of extra spread nobody has to vote for.
Or maybe the US govt could increase taxes on the wealthy and on corporations. Plus cut the defense budget in half by focusing on defense and stopping silly wars and stopping buying expensive weapons by focusing on cheaper drones?
Reducing debt by inflation essentially makes all non-wealthy poorer by devaluing the currency,
Your last sentence has been the plan all along.
Even if both happened, it wouldn’t close the gap. Double the corporate tax take and halve defense and you’ve found maybe US$800 billion against a US$2 trillion deficit, before interest grows again. But your last sentence is right, and that’s the point of the essay. Inflating the debt away is a tax on the people least able to dodge it. Thanks for reading.
I agree. However, everything a person does to move them selves forward, is fair game. We are not in the “club”… Our homes, our health, our families are at risk. It is up to us to take care of our immediate area. And enjoy the days with fun and healthy life…
Lau, is there a new special report on the horizon? I enjoy your writing.
Thanks, Jeremy. Really appreciate that. And yes, there’s a new special report coming this month.
'America had just won a world war'? Oh please! Nobody else involved then.
Thanks, John. Should I list every country that won? My grandfather fought on the Eastern Front, and somehow I don’t think he’d be offended by the statement that America won the war too.
'Should I list every country' is a silly remark Lau. For the record my father fought and won medals for bravery in the second war. I am certain he would take offence. The allies won the war and America turned up late (again).
Hitler was funded by Wall Street and the banking interests.
America should have never been involved in that war to begin with. Should have never showed up at all
Perhaps you've forgotten a little event in Pearl Harbour
I largely agree with your thesis, but I see a potential problem with the “captive buyers” part of the argument.
Stablecoins may create substantial demand for T-bills, but to the extent that stablecoin balances come from bank deposits, aren't we partly moving money from one Treasury buyer/funding channel to another rather than creating genuinely new demand?
More importantly, financial repression has a cost. If banks, insurers, pension funds and money-market funds are increasingly pushed into Treasuries at negative real yields, the losses do not disappear. They eventually show up as weaker bank/insurance profitability, pension funding problems, lower returns for savers and retirees, or higher contributions and premiums. Politically, that could become difficult to sustain.
And the stronger the repression becomes, the greater the incentive for unconstrained investors to move toward equities, gold, foreign assets and other stores of value.
So I wonder whether the real constraint on this strategy is not the government's ability to manufacture Treasury demand, but how much negative real return it can impose on the domestic financial system before the economic and political side effects become too large.
Thanks, Attila. All fair, and I’d agree the real limit is political rather than mechanical. On stablecoins: partly a reshuffle, yes, but a deposit funds whatever the bank chooses, while a stablecoin reserve is bills by law. It converts optional demand into mandatory demand, which is the point. On the cost of repression, it doesn’t disappear, it lands on savers, pensioners and bank margins, slowly enough that nobody can point to the day it happened. That’s the design. The 1940s and 50s imposed it for fifteen years without a revolt. And on the exodus to gold and equities: agreed, and that’s exactly where I’d want to be. :)
Thanks, Lau. I agree with the mechanics of your argument, but I have some reservations about using the 1940s and 1950s as a precedent for what might work today.
First, the underlying growth conditions were fundamentally different. Postwar America benefited from much higher fertility, an expanding workforce, and, over subsequent decades, a dramatic increase in female labour-force participation. Today, with fertility around 1.6, an ageing population, and much lower potential real GDP growth, we have far less capacity to grow our way out of the debt burden.
Second, from an Austrian economics perspective, today's starting point is very different. Decades of exceptionally low interest rates have arguably encouraged malinvestment and distortions in the capital structure. Further suppressing real interest rates risks perpetuating these distortions, discouraging the necessary reallocation of capital, and weakening future productivity growth. Financial repression may reduce the government's financing costs without increasing the real savings needed to support productive investment.
Third, the structure of Treasury demand has changed substantially. Unlike in the 1940s, investors can legally move into gold and other assets to escape negative real yields. An ageing population is increasingly drawing down retirement savings rather than accumulating them, potentially reducing net demand for financial assets. And foreign investors now hold roughly 30% of publicly held Treasuries, making the market far more dependent on investors who cannot easily be compelled to accept negative real dollar returns.
Finally, the costs of repression would increasingly fall directly on households through defined-contribution pensions, 401(k)s, and other retirement savings. Persistent negative real returns could erode the purchasing power of accumulated savings precisely when a growing share of the population depends on them.
My concern is therefore not whether the government can mechanically create captive demand for Treasuries. It probably can, at least for some time. The question is whether doing so in an ageing, low-growth economy, already burdened by accumulated capital distortions, would progressively undermine the real savings, productive capital formation, and economic growth needed to sustain the debt itself.
The postwar U.S. could combine financial repression with strong underlying growth. Today, we may be attempting the same strategy under almost the opposite structural conditions.
Could financial repression therefore become economically self-defeating long before it becomes politically unsustainable?
Thanks, Attila. I think we mostly agree, so let me clarify one thing: I’m not saying this will work. The essay is about what the gov't will probably do, not whether it succeeds. And on that score you’re basically making my case for me. No growth tailwind, capital already misallocated, buyers who can leave, losses landing on households. All true, and also all reasons the “other means” have to get more coercive over time, not less. The FIMA pawn shop exists precisely because the foreign 30% can’t be compelled, not directly at least. And of course the stablecoin push exists because the domestic buyers aren’t captive enough yet. So the way I see it, each tool is an admission that the last one wasn’t sufficient. Self-defeating before politically unsustainable? Probably. At the end of the day, “repression” doesn’t fix anything. It buys time at the cost of growth. That’s the Argentine lesson.
Thanks, Lau. That clarification makes sense, and I think we largely agree. I approached the question from the perspective of whether financial repression could succeed under today's structural conditions. In contrast, you focus on why governments will increasingly resort to it regardless of the long-term consequences.
Your point that each new intervention reflects the inadequacy of the previous one is particularly interesting. It also fits the Austrian perspective: interventions intended to correct the consequences of earlier interventions tend to generate further distortions, creating pressure for yet more intervention.
And I agree that the Argentine experience may ultimately be a more relevant warning than the postwar American precedent. Financial repression can postpone the adjustment, but it cannot eliminate the underlying economic problem.
Thanks for the thoughtful exchange.
Thank you Lau for narrowing down on this...
On the street I live, replaying the film in slow-motion helps to filter out the daily noise:
The road map is price stability from productivity gains...
1. An upward trending wage inflation and close to full employment for households as a consequence of "re-migration" and it's effect on labor market prices.
2. The inflation pressures from above 1. are moderated and netted out by gigantic productivity gains as knowledge intensive workers replace the re-migrated (hand-to-head-use-ratio change). E.g. enormous productivity gains take place throughout all value chains when former knowledge workers participate in new and existing businesses, streamlining and professionalizing them.
The auctioning and pairing of previously unavailable supply/demand of knowledge could be explosive if amplified by...
3. Flow and broader redistribution of risk capital from inheritance events. This is currently locked up with conservative generations who have less an idea of how to navigate "the now" and capitalize on it.
4. And finally of course all the new real or imagined headcount created (enormous productivity gains) at the data centers throughout the nation. Even if as expected only 50% enter operation it should be quite the fireworks.
5. The USD will survive via elevated rates as the new normal AND be used as our biggest weapon in dealing with friends as foes alike (rinse repeat). We did it in the 80ies and will likely resort to the same screenplay as we head toward renewed tension abroad. The main difference between then and now is that we "own" a lot of real estate and board rooms.
Trump likely meant what he said, but "forgot" to mention which type of inflation he meant: Wage inflation without the evils of broad price inflation.